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The Violence Against Women Act:
Civil Rights for Sexual Assault Victims
W. H.

HALLOCK*

The attempt to split bias from violence has been this society's most
enduring and fatal rationalization.
Patricia Williams'
INTRODUCTION
In December, 1989, a gunman entered the University of Montreal
engineering school, systematically separated out all of the women from a
group of people gathered there, and shot them with a high-powered rifle
at close range, killing fourteen women and wounding thirteen.2 The
suicide note he left stated that women were to blame for his problems,
especially the "feminists." 3 The similarity between this crime and the two
million rapes4 and four million beatings 5 that women suffer each year at
the hands of men is far greater than most people would like to admit. The
parallel between violence against women generally and the Montreal
murders is that, in both, women are targeted for violence mainly "because
they are women: not individually or at random, but on the basis of sex,
because of their membership in a group defined by gender." 6 The fact

* J.D., 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1986, Middlebury College,
Middlebury, Vermont. Many thanks to Lauren Robel and Rita Noonan for their help with this Note.
1. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murderingthe Messenger: The DiscourseofFingerpointingas the Law's
Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 139 (1987).
2. David E. Pitt, Montreal Gunman Had Suicide Note, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1989, at A9.
3.Id.
4. This figure takes into account underreporting. Violence Against Women: Victims of the System:
Hearing on S. 15 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 215 (1991) [hereinafter
HearingsPart 111]. The Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) estimated that there
were 127,000 rapes in 1989. Id. Both the federal government and the BJS acknowledge that
methodological flaws result in severe undercounting of rapes. Id. The number of reported rapes exceeded
100,000 for the first time in 1990. Id. at 184; see also Women and Violence: Hearings on Legislation
to Reduce the GrowingProblem of Violent Crime Against Women Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (Part2), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1990) [hereinafter HearingsPart11].
5. Hearings Part11, supra note 4, at I 1l.
6. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301
(1991).
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that ninety-seven percent of all sex crime victims are women clearly
illustrates that gender-targeted violence exists.7
The confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the
William Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson rape trials, and the Navy's

Tailhook Association sex scandal have all helped bring the issues of
sexual harassment and sexual assault to the forefront of national attention.
Such exposure, however, does not necessarily correlate with a more

enlightened general public or with any reduction in violence against
women. 8 A problem as pervasive as the epidemic of gender-based 9
violence in this country should be addressed in a comprehensive manner.
A solution should bring some measure of relief to the victims of sex-based
crimes while simultaneously raising public awareness and changing the
national attitude which exists toward these types of crimes and their

victims.' °
7. Women and Violence: Hearingon Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problemof Violent Crime
Against Women Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary(Part1), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990)
[hereinafter Hearings Part1](opening statement of Committee Chairman, Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.).
8. The precise effect of exposure on the amount of violence is impossible to determine. What is
clear, however, is that exposure helps to empower some victims. For example, since the confirmation
of Justice Clarence Thomas, sexual harassment complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission have increased 45%. Claudia MacLachlan, Harassment Charges Up One Year After Hill,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1992, at 7. Others fear that the harsh treatment of Anita Hill will discourage other
victims from coming forward. An Issue Ensnares Appointee, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1992, at A13
("Compared with a year ago, it is easier to understand why a woman who has been harassed would not
file a formal complaint.'). See generally Nina Burleigh, Now That It's Over, A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1992, at
50 (providing an overview of the Thomas confirmation hearings). The suggestion by Pennsylvania
Senator Arlen Specter that Anita Hill "fantasized" the alleged encounters with Clarence Thomas is a fine
example of one of the most widely held myths about the victims of sex crimes. For a discussion of
commonly held rape myths, see Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea
ofa Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions,24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1013 (1991). There is debate surrounding
the acquittal of William Kennedy Smith and its likely effect on future rape trials. See generally Mark
Hansen, Experts Expected Smith Verdict, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1992, at 18.
9. "Sex" typically refers to a person's biological structure as male or female, while "gender" is
a social construct which refers to socially created expectations of male and female attitudes and
behaviors. CYNTIIIA F. EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DIsTINCTIONs 5-6 (1988); see also WINNIE HAZOU, THE
SOCIAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN 15 (1990). However, because one's sex and gender are so
closely linked in our society, the words "sex" and "gender" are used interchangeably in this Note.
10. HearingsPartI, supranote 7, at 2-3. It is ironic that our national anti-crime attitude could lead
to legislation making "crjacking" a federal offense punishable by life in prison or death, see CarTheft
Measure Advances, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at AS; Gwen Ifill, Pushing Anti-Crime Issues, Bush
Cites Arkansas Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at A19, yet there is considerable opposition to
making gender-based violence a federal civil rights crime. For a discussion of opposition to the Violence
Against Women Act, see infra notes 224-43.
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The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)" is a legislative attempt
to deal with the national problem of gender-motivated violence. This Note
examines the problem of violence against women and suggests that the
VAWA, if applied as intended, could help prevent violent sex
discrimination.12 Drawing upon an analogy to violent racial
discrimination, 3 this Note argues that sexual assault and domestic
violence are crimes predominantly motivated by the victim's gender.
Thousands of women are discriminated against and deprived of their civil
rights on a daily basis. A national solution like the VAWA is a vital first
step in addressing the problem of gender-motivated violence.
Part I of this Note discusses the prevalence and the nature of violence
against women. Part II presents a brief overview of the various provisions
of the VAWA. Title III of the VAWA, the most controversial portion of
the Act, creates a federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
gender-motivated violence. 4 Part III summarizes the specific provisions
of Title III and discusses the need for, and the advantages of, making
gender-motivated violence a federal civil rights violation. Part IV
examines the scope of the Title III civil rights provision and analyzes the
likely outcomes of several possible claims that could be brought under
Title III. Part V of this Note discusses the likely effect of Title III on the
rising tide of violence against women in this country and concludes that
the Act would have significant practical and symbolic effects.

11. S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1502, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The current
version of the VAWA is substantially similar to the original bill, S. 2754, introduced by Senator Joseph
Biden on June 19, 1990 in the 101st Congress. See CONG. REc., June 19, 1990, at S8263. The Senate
Judiciary Committee held three hearings on the original bill, and it was reported favorably to the floor
of the Senate, but no action was taken on the bill before the end of the 101st Congress. S. REP. No. 197,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1991). The current version of the bill, S. 15, was reintroduced in the 102d
Congress in January, 1991. See CONG. REc., Jan. 14, 1991, at S597. The Senate Judiciary Committee
held one more hearing on S. 15. S. REP. No. 197, supra, at 35. Although the bill was reported favorably
out of committee, it was not acted on by the full Senate and will therefore have to be reintroduced in
the next session.
12. The VAWA is premised on the fact that many forms of violence against women are gendermotivated and are therefore a form of violent sex discrimination. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 4243; see also infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
13. I realize there are limitations to analogizing the plight of African-Americans to that of women.
Some believe, for example, that ,comparing the situation of women to that of African-Americans
trivializes the economic deprivation and violent racism faced by African-Americans in this cotintry. See
Christine A. Littleton, RestructuringSexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1288 (1987). Also, there
is little doubt that sexism exists within racial classes and that racism exists within gender classes. Id.
However, with these limitations in mind, an analogy between the experiences of women and AfricanAmericans can be useful. To the extent that race analogies are used in this Note, it is solely for the
purpose of illuminating a particular idea by reference to a concept-race discrimination-with which
some readers will be more familiar.
14. HearingsPartI, supra note 7, at 18.
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I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. Historical and Social Context: A Brief Overview
The current problem of violence against women can be better understood
if viewed in historical context. Other authors have written extensively on
the historical subordination of women in this country." A fine example
of women's historical subordination lingers with us today in the form of
a common idiomatic expression. The phrase "rule of thumb" originated
when early American courts expressly recognized a man's right to beat his
wife provided he used a stick no larger in diameter than his thumb. 6
In addition to a historical understanding, an awareness of the
inequalities and discrimination that still exist today makes it easier to
understand gender-based violence as an extension of such inequality.
Many of the most blatant forms of discrimination against women have
disappeared with time, 7 and women have undoubtedly made significant
strides toward equality over the past thirty years. However, contrary to the
beliefs of most Americans, 8 "[w]omen are dramatically underrepresented
in the highest positions of social, economic, and political power, and [are]
dramatically overrepresented in the lowest positions."' 9 Even though
more women now hold elective office than ever before, they still account
for only 6% of the U.S. Senate and 10.8% of the U.S. House of
Representatives.2"
15. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) ("[T]he civil law, as well as
nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man
and woman.") (Bradley, J.,
concurring); DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 26-44 (1983); SUSAN M. OKiN,
WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1979); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 9
(1989); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 2-5 (1990).

For example, at common law, women "could not hold, acquire, control, bequeath, or convey property,
retain their own wages, enter into contracts, or initiate legal actions." RHODE, supra, at 10.
16. MARTIN, supra note 15, at 32. Much violence against women, including the "rule of thumb"
and marital rape, rests upon the traditional idea that women, and wives in particular, are little more than
the property of men. RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 3.
17. Not all state-sanctioned forms of subordination have disappeared. For example, some states still
have a marital rape exception, and some states still provide civil immunity to parents (i.e., men) who
rape their children. S. REP.No. 197, supra note 11, at 45.
18. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1735 (1991) ("For most Americans, gender inequality is not a serious
problem ....
").
19. Id. at 1733.
20. Nina Burleigh, Much Has Been Done, But More Is Expected, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 27, 1992,
Womanews Section, at 5. Only 11% of large law firm partners are women. Claudia MacLachlan & Rita
H. Jensen, ProgressGlacialFor Women, Minorities,NAT'L L.J, Jan. 27, 1992, at 31. Similarly, women
hold about 13% of all tenured academic positions. Rhode, supra note 18, at 1764.
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Despite measures to address sex discrimination in the workplace, such
as the Equal Pay Act 2 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,22
inequality in employment is still the norm, with women earning seventy
cents for each dollar men earn. 23 The working world continues to be both
highly gender segregated and gender stratified, with women at the
bottom.

24

Poverty is beginning to have such a disproportionate effect on

women that scholars have termed the problem the "feminization of
poverty. 21 5 Some analysts have concluded that if current trends continue,
the "poverty population
will consist entirely of women and their children
"
before the year 2000.

126

The family is perhaps the realm where gender inequality and
discrimination is most pronounced, yet most ignored. For example, the
burden of housework and childcare remains predominantly upon
women. 27 Despite a rapid increase in married women's participation in
the full-time workforce, men's participation in household work has
remained astonishingly low.

28

Further, some women are arguably safer

in the streets than in their own homes.29 Violence in the family, directed
mainly towards women, occurs with frightening frequency and severity.3"

21. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
23. Sylvia Nasar, Women's Progress Stalled? Just Not So, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, § 3
(Business), at 1.Women reached their record high seventy-two cents for every dollar men earn in 1990.
Id. Up until 1980 women earned sixty cents for every dollar men earned. Id. During the economic
expansion of the 1980s women's median annual salary increased while men's decreased after inflation
thus accounting for some of women's gains. Id.
24. See Rhode, supra note 18, at 1733. Over 40% of working women are concentrated in just ten
jobs. MYRA M. FERREE & BETH B. HESS, CONTROVERSY AND COALITION: THE NEW FEMINIST
MOVEMENT 143 (1985). The "big ten" jobs predominantly occupied by women are: nurse, elementary
school teacher, secretary, bookkeeper, typist, sales clerk, waitress, cashier, sewer/stitcher, and domestic
worker. Id. Women represent 99% of typists, secretaries, and telephone operators, 97% of domestic
service workers, and 80% of clerical workers. HARRIET BRADLEY, MEN'S WORK, WOMEN'S WORK 17
(1989) (using statistics from a study done in the early 1980s).
25. NANCY FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL THEORY 144 (1989). See generally RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST (rev. ed.,

Penguin Books 1992) (1986).
26. FRASER, supra note 25, at 145.
27. FERREE &HESs, supra note 24, at 157.
28. Id.; EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 210; Littleton, supra note 13, at 1334.
29. HearingsPartII, supra note 4, at 119 ("[W]omen in the United States are more likely to be
assaulted and injured, raped, or killed by a male partner than by any other type of assailant.") (testimony
of Angela Browne, Ph.D., Dep't of Psychiatry, Univ. Mass. Med. School [hereinafter Browne
testimony]); see infra note 39 and accompanying text. For a detailed look at the study by Angela
Browne, see Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams, Exploringthe Effect ofResourceAvailabilityand the
Likelihood of Female-PerpetuatedHomicides, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 75 (1989).
30. HearingsPartII, supra note 4, at 119.
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B. Women and Violence
The historical and social context briefly described above provides a
backdrop against which the problem of violence against women can be
seen and judged more clearly. The background is one of substantive
inequality in every major institution of our society-work, family, and
government. With this in mind, it is easier to understand that the sexual
violence suffered almost exclusively by women at the hands of men 31 is
more than isolated instances of crime by sex-crazed maniacs. 32 Rather it
is a systemic, society-wide problem 33 that demands an equally expansive
solution. The fear of violence based on one's sex has created a climate of
terror that helps maintain the inequality and disadvantaged status of all
34
women.

In a society with as much crime as ours, it is understandable that people
might worry about the possibility of becoming a victim of crime. Statistics
show that men are more likely to be the victims of violent crimes than
women. 35 However, while violence against men has dropped

significantly, the rate of crime against women has risen.36 More
37

significantly, unlike men, women are often targeted for violent crime
precisely because of their status as women. 3 s Moreover, violence against

31. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text.
32. Contrary to popular belief, most rapists are very similar to the "boy next door"; the personality
profile of the average rapist is surprisingly normal. See Torrey, supra note 8, at 1022-23; see also
SUSAN GRIFFIN, RAPE 9 (3d ed. 1986) ('[I]f the professional rapist is to be separated from the average
dominant heterosexual, it may be mainly a quantitative difference."); CATHY ROBERTS, WOMEN AND
RAPE 22 (1989) ("[T]here is a close similarity between accepted and valued masculinity and the
attributes necessary to commit rape."); see also infra note 251.
33. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 171-83 (1989).
34. See NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT OF
1991, at 1 (1991) [hereinafter NOW LDEF] (on file with author) ("Much like racial attacks, attacks on
individual women create a climate of terror that makes all women afraid to step 'out of line."); see also
infra text accompanying note 45.
35. Tamar Lewin, 25% ofAssaults Against Women Are by the Men in Their Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 1991, at A20 (relying on new study done by Justice Department's BJS).
36. HearingsPartI, supra note 7, at 2 ("[O]ver the last 15 years, violence against young men in
America has dropped by 12 percent, while violence against young women in America has increased 50
percent.") (statement of Sen. Biden).
37. The U.S. Code defines violent crime as any offense "that has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force" against another, or any offense that "is a felony and that, by
its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may
be used" to commit the crime. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988). The VAWA uses this same definition. S. 15,
supra note 11, § 301(d)(2).
38. See Torrey, supra note 8, at 1059 ("Rape is a sex-based crime, the only crime in which men
are the offenders and women the victims."). Prison rape is an exception where men are both the
offenders and the victims. For a discussion of prison rape, see SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 285-97 (1975).
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women is six times more likely to be committed by intimates. 39 Thus,

while both men and women worry about crime in general, women have the
additional concern of becoming a victim of crime simply because they are
women.
Violent crimes motivated by the victim's status as a member of a
particular group are known as bias or hate crimes. 40 Accordingly,

whenever a woman is victimized simply because of her sex, she is the
victim of a hate crime. Hate crimes differ from ordinary crimes. Hate
crime victimization leaves far more than physical damage; psychological
and emotional damage are inflicted on the victim and the victim's
community. 4' Because they cannot change their race, sex, or ethnicity,
"targeted people understandably feel helpless and vulnerable to further
attacks. ' 42 The VAWA recognizes that some of the most common forms
of violence women suffer, such as rape and domestic violence, are

essentially hate crimes-a form of violent sexism 4 3-which

warrant

federal civil rights protection.

39. Lewin, supra note 35, at A20. Twenty-five percent of violent crimes against women are
committed by family members or by men the women have dated, while the comparable figure for men
is only 4%. Id. at A20; see also supra note 29.

40. The California Attorney General's Commission on Racial, Ethnic, Religious, and Minority
Violence provides one of the best definitions of "hate crimes":
any act of intimidation, harassment, physical force or threat of physical force directed against
any person, or family, or their property or advocate, motivated either in whole or in part by
hostility to their real or perceived race, ethnic background, national origin, religious belief, sex,
age, disability, or sexual orientation, with the intention of causing fear or intimidation, or to
deter the free exercise, or enjoyment of any rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States or the State of California whether or not performed under the color
of law. (Cal. Dept. of Justice, 1986).
Lois COPELAND & LESLIE R. WOLFE, CENTER FOR WOMEN POLICY STUDIES, VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN AS BIAS MOTIVATED HATE CRIME 8 (1991) (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON
RACIAL, ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND MINORITY VIOLENCE, CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (1986))

(copy on file with author). Notice that this definition includes the category "sex." Other definitions have
not been so inclusive and omit the category of "sex." See State Hate Crimes Statutory Provisions, in
HATE CRIME STATUTES: A 1991 STATUS REPORT 22-23 app. B (Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith,

New York, N.Y., 1991).
41. Joseph M. Fernandez, Bringing Hate Crime Into Focus, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 262-

63 (1991).
42. Id.
43. Hearings Part I, supra note 7, at 2.
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44
1. The Problem of Rape

[R]ape is a form of mass terrorism, for the victims of rape are chosen
indiscriminately, but the propagandists for male supremacy broadcast
that it is women who cause rape by being unchaste or in the wrong
place at the wrong time-in essence, by behaving as though they were
free.45

The fear of rape is a part of almost every woman's life.46 Women must
plan and schedule certain daily activities with the underlying fear of
sexual assault in mind.47 In contrast, most men do not think about, talk
about, or fear rape. 4' Given the staggering statistics, the fears of women
about sexual assault (and the lack of fear in men) are clearly
understandable.

44. The scope of this Note precludes a comprehensive discussion of the problem of rape.
Scholarship on the subject of rape is extensive and the following list of sources is not meant to be
exhaustive. LINDA B. BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE (1989); BROWNMILLER, supra note 38; SUSAN
ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); GRIFFIN, supra note 32; ROBERTS, supra note 32; DIANE E.H. RUSSELL,
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION (1984) [hereinafter RUSSELL, EXPLOITATION]; RUSSELL, supra note 15; JULIA
R. SCHWENDNGER & HERMAN SCHWENDINGER, RAPE AND INEQUALITY (1983).
45. GRIFFIN, supra note 32, at 23.
46. Id. at 4; see EsTRicH, supra note 44, at 3 ("I don't think I know a single woman who does not
live with some fear of being raped."); Hearings PartI, supra note 7, at 19 (statement of Sen. Strom
Thurmond) (discussing the "simple fact that our daughters and wives fear walking down city streets
alone or entering their homes at night. .. .'); Cf. MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE
FEMALE FEAR 21 (1989) (stating that recent studies estimate that one-third of women fear rape daily).
47. See supra note 46; see, e.g., HearingsPart111, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of Sen. Biden) ("A
recent study showed that 75%... of the women surveyed never go out alone at night to see a movie
because they fear rape and other violent crimes.').
In much of the literature on violence against women, terms referring to acts of sexual violence, such
as "sexual assault" and "rape," are often used interchangeably and not necessarily in accordance with
their precise legal definition. Because this Note is interested in the larger nature of the problem of
violence against women, the terms "sexual assault," "rape," and "sexual violence" are used
interchangeably unless specifically stated otherwise, or unless the context makes the definition of the
term explicit.
Many states have enacted rape reform statutes that redefine rape as "criminal sexual conduct" or
"sexual assault." Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1148 (1986); see MACKINNON, supra note
33, at 174. The purpose of redefining or relabelling the crime is to distinguish between sex and violence.
Id. "Rape" encompasses both in one word. Redefinition also helps to "rid the crime of its common law
baggage." Estrich, supra, at 1148. For a detailed discussion of rape reform laws and the implications
of their changes in language, see id. at 1133-61.
48. See Lynne N Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 193, 225
(1987-88) (reviewing ESTRICH, supra note 44). Incarcerated men are the exception; many prison inmates
have reason to fear rape on a daily basis. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 38, at 285-97.
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In 1990, both the number of reported rapes and the total percentage of

women raped reached record highs. 49 A 1990 study shows that one of
every five women will be raped at some point in her life.50 Increased
numbers of rapes are not simply the result of more reportings. Reports
from independent sources, such as rape crisis centers, confirm that rape
rates are rising even faster than the official FBI estimates suggest. 5'
Furthermore, rape still remains the most underreported of all crimes, with
only seven percent of victims reporting their assaults. 2 Although certain
women are more at risk than others,5 3 no particular class of women is
exempt from the threat of sexual assault. Students,54 married women,"
and minorities5 6 all face significant risk.
These statistics help illustrate two points. First, they show the
magnitude and severity of the problem. Second, and perhaps more
importantly, they help show that rape is a crime of "violence that ' is7
directed against women for the sole reason that they are women."

Women, and almost exclusively women, of every race, economic class,
49. HearingsPart111, supra note 4, at 189. Although 100,000 rapes were reported in 1990, it is
generally acknowledged that the actual number of rapes is much higher due to nonreporting and
methodological flaws in the reporting systems. See id. at 214-15. A good estimate of the actual number
of rapes is two million. Id. Moreover, the number of reported rapes rose to 106,593 in 1991. This
represents a 3.9% increase over 1990. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 1991, at 23 (1992).
50. Hearings PartII, supra note 4, at 77 (citing study by Koss et al., A Criminological Study,
released Aug. 29, 1990 [hereinafter Koss study]).
51. Hearings PartIII, supra note 4, at 196.
52. Id. at 194. Comparable reporting rates for other crimes are: burglary-53%, robbery-53%, and
assault-46%. Id.
53. See CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 8

(1991). African-American women, young women, women with low incomes, unemployed women,
women who rent, and women who live in inner-cities are all at higher risk of beiifg raped than other
groups of women. Id.
54. One of every four female college students will be sexually attacked and one of every seven
raped before graduating. HearingsPartII, supra note 4, at 77 (citing Koss study, supra note 50). High
school girls also suffer very high risk. Young women between the ages of 16 and 19 are the most likely
victims of rape, and about 500,000 current high school girls will be raped before they graduate. Id. at
78.
55. In a study of 930 women from San Francisco, 8% of the married women had been the victims
of rape or attempted rape by their husbands or ex-husbands. RUSSELL, EXPLOITATION, supra note 44,
at 59. In another study, 10% of surveyed women said their husbands had used force, or threatened to
use force, to tryto have sex with them. Factson Rape, LEGAL RESOURCE Krr ON VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN (NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, New York, N.Y.) Aug. 1989, at 18 [hereinafter
NOW KIT] (copy on file with author).
56. See HARLOW, supra note 53, at 8 ("Black women with low incomes [are] more likely to be
raped... than white women in any income category."). Black women have long suffered the ravages
of rape, especially at the hands of white, slaveholding males. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 38, at 16584.
57. HearingsPart I, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Sen. Biden).
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and ethnic group are the targets of such crime. 8 Since women, because
of their very status as women, remain the primary target for sexual assault

by men, sex crimes can be considered a form of sex discrimination.59
2. The Problem of Domestic Violence
American women are more likely to be "assaulted and injured, raped, or
killed by a male partner than by any other type of assailant."6 ° Of all the
women who seek medical treatment in hospital emergency rooms, onethird are there to receive treatment for injuries suffered because of

beatings by their husbands. 6 Even the U.S. Surgeon General has reported
that women are injured more because of battering than any other cause.62
An estimated four million women will be battered by their male partners
on the level of aggravated assault in any given year.63
As with rape, there are various theories offered to explain the cause and
prevalence of battery, but there is no definitive explanation. 64 Like
sexual assault, however, it is very clear that women are usually the
victims, and men are usually the perpetrators. 65 Accordingly, like sexual

58. Obviously men are not physically incapable of being raped; incarcerated men often face rape
and sexual assault. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 38, at 285-97. This Note also recognizes the tragedy
of sexual abuse of children. See generally RUSSELL, EXPLOITATION, supra note 44, at 285-90. However,
this Note focuses exclusively on violence against women because 97% of all victims of sex crimes are
women. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
59. As one author stated, rape can be classified as "overwhelmingly a crime of one gender against
the other." Henderson, supra note 48, at 225. There are various theories about why men rape women.
See, e.g., HAZOU, supra note 9, at 108 ("[Rape] is an expression of power over a situation and control
over a woman."); MACKINNON, supra note 33, at 172 ("[R]ape is ... an act of terrorism and torture
within a systematic context of group subjection, like lynching.'); RHODE, supra note 15, at 252 ("The
crime of rape mustbe reconceptualized as the product of power ... .'); ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 29
("In committing rape, the individual rapist can be expressing feelings of ownership, hatred, power, and
revenge."); Torrey, supra note 8, at 1071 ("Rape is a form of social control of women."). See generally
LARRY BARON & MURRAY A. STRAusS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1989). If
women are chosen as victims of rape because of their sex, the exact reason why men commit rape
becomes less important in understanding the need for anti-discrimination legislation.
60. Hearings Part II, supra note 4, at 119 (Browne testimony, supra note 29). Of all the women
murdered in this country, more than half are killed by their male partner. Id. at 114.
61. Id. at 84 (statement of Sen. Biden).
62. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 36 n.10; cf HearingsPartII, supranote 4, at 93 (testimony
of Charlotte Fedders, author of SHATTERED DREAMS, 1987) ("Battering is the single [largest] cause of
injury to women-exceeding rape, mugging and auto accidents combined.').
63. HearingsPart 11, supra note 4, at 11l (Browne testimony, supra note 29).
64. See MARTIN, supra note 15, at 45-72.
65. Studies show that women also perpetrate acts of "abuse" in the home. HearingsPartII, supra
note 4, at 117 (Browne testimony, supra note 29). Those studies do not show, however, whether any
of the women who commit abuse are acting in self-defense. Id. Moreover, the outcomes, frequency, and
types of aggression perpetrated by men and women are very different. Men perpetrate more acts of
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assault, many incidents of domestic violence can be viewed as a form of
violent sex discrimination within the home. 6 The VAWA would attempt
to change society's68 continued tolerance of domestic violence 67 and its
often tragic results.

II. PROVISIONS OF THE VAWA
The VAWA is a desperately needed legislative attempt to address the
"'violent sexism"6 9 that exists in our society. The Act is divided into five
separate titles.70 Title III is the civil rights provision detailed in Part III

below. The other provisions are far less controversial because they deal
primarily with increased funding for domestic violence prevention
programs and education on gender-based violence, 7' and will therefore
be mentioned only briefly in this Part.

A. Title I
Title I, the Safe Streets for Women Act, seeks to improve safety outside
the home by increasing the penalties for federal cases of rape and
aggravated rape. 72 It creates new penalties for repeat offenders 73 and
provides grants for law enforcement and prosecution efforts directed
specifically at reducing violent crimes against women. 74 Title I also

violence, more often, and with more severity (due to strength and use of weapons), and male aggression
is usually a pattern in the relationship. Id.
66. It is interesting to note that the word "family" comes from "familia," a Latin word "signifying
the totality of slaves belonging to a man." Del Martin, The HistoricalRoots of Domestic Violence, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL 5 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987).
67. For example, there are almost three times as many animal shelters in this country as there are
battered women's shelters. Hearings Part11, supra note 4, at 79 (citing data from Koss study, supra
note 50). In Washington, D.C., "an abusive spouse is arrested in less than 15% of the cases where the
victim is bleeding from an open wound." Id. at 85 (statement of Sen. Biden). See also, e.g.,
SusAN
SCHECrER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE 157-69 (1982).
68. See, e.g., Hearings PartII, supra note 4, at 101-03 (testimony of Tracy Motuzick). Tracy
Motuzick (formerly Tracy Thurman) was the victim of a brutal assault by her husband in Torrington,
Connecticut, in 1985. While police were on the scene, her husband attacked her, stabbed her 13 times,
and broke her neck. Id. Although permanently paralyzed, she survived and eventually brought a
successful suit against the city of Torrington for denying her equal protection of the laws. Thurman v.
City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
69. Hearings Part I,supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Sen. Biden).
70. S. 15, supra note 11.
71. Id. §§ 121-133, 161-163, 231, 243-249, 251-252, 261, 403, 511, 514.
72. Id. §§ 111-112.
73.Id. § 111.
74. Id. § 121.
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creates three new Federal Rules of Evidence, based on the existing
Federal Rape Shield Law,75 governing the use of a victim's past sexual
history in criminal and civil cases.76
B. Title 1I
Title II, entitled the Safe Homes for Women Act, remedies some
existing defects in state protective orders by requiring that a protective
order issued in one state be given "full faith and credit" in all other
states." By providing funding, Title II encourages states to take
domestic abuse seriously and to institute mandatory arrest policies in
domestic dispute cases.78 Increased funding for battered women shelters
7
and family violence prevention programs is also included in Title 11. 1

C. Title IV
Title IV addresses the increasing problem of sexual assaults on college
and university campuses across the country. 80 It increases funding for
rape education programs and requires schools to report the incidence of
sexual assaults on their campuses.8 ' Such a measure is needed because
educational institutions are reluctant to respond to the problem of campus
sexual assaults in a firm manner because of fear about creating negative
publicity."2 In 1989, the three largest college campuses in the United
States reported only three rapes.83 Campus studies suggest the actual
number was closer to 1,275.4
D. Title V
Title V provides funding to implement educational programs to train
state court judges and court personnel on issues related to violent crimes

75. FED. R. EvID. 412.
76. S. 15, supra note 11, §§ 151-154. These new rules would extend the coverage of current Rule
412 to all criminal cases and slightly alter its procedures. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 57-58.
77. S. 15, supra note 11, § 211.
78. Id.
79. Id. §§ 231, 241.
80. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
81. S. 15, supra note 11, §§ 401-403.
82. Hearings Part II, supra note 4, at 62 (testimony of Erica Strohl, Co-Founder, Univ. of
Minnesota's Students Together Against Acquaintance Rape).
83. Id. at 76 (citing Koss study, supra note 50).
84. Id.
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against women. 85 Title V also focuses on federal courts, encouraging the

judicial council of each circuit to undertake gender bias studies to gain a
better understanding "of the nature and extent of gender bias in the
Federal courts. 86
III. TITLE III: THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROVISION OF THE VAWA

Title III of the VAWA87 recognizes the bias element inherent in many

types of violence against women, including rape and domestic violence.
The Act recognizes that women are the primary victims of sexual violence
and that they are targeted for violence because of their sex. Women, who
comprise over one-half of our population, are thus "reduced to symbols
of group hatred they have no individual power to change or escape. The
violence not only wounds physically, it degrades and terrorizes, instilling

fear and inhibiting the lives of all those similarly situated.

88

Accordingly, the VAWA acknowledges gender-motivated violence as a
form of sex discrimination worthy of federal civil rights protection. 89
Title III of the VAWA creates a federal civil rights cause of action for
victims of gender-motivated violence.9" This country has a long history
of creating federal civil rights laws to prevent various forms of

discrimination. Soon after the Civil War ended in 1865, Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 18669t to enforce the provisions of the Thirteenth

Amendment abolishing slavery.92 Similarly, in 1871 Congress passed the
Ku Klux Klan Act 93 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and protect

85. S. 15, supra note 11, §§ 511-514.

86. Id. §§ 521-522. Currently 16 states have published findings based on studies of gender bias in
their court systems. Update: GenderBias in the Courts, TRIAL, July 1991, at 112 (interview with Lynn
Schafran). The results of all the studies are similar: the court systems show the presence of "gender bias
ranging from the subtle to the direct." Id. Thirty-three other states, as well as several federal circuits,
are in the process of conducting studies. Id. Only the Ninth Circuit has any preliminary results. See infra
note 164 and accompanying text.
87. S.15, supra note 11, § 301.
88. S. REp. No.197, supra note 11, at 43.
89. The idea of sexual violence as actionable sex discrimination is not a new one. See MacKinnon,
supra note 6; see also Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause, 95 YALE L.J.
788 (1986); Robin West, Equality Theory, MaritalRape, and the Promiseofthe FourteenthAmendment,
42 FLA. L. REV.45 (1990).

90. S.15, supra note 11, § 301(c).
91. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C. (1988)).
92. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 431 (1968).
93. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
(1988)).
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newly-freed slaves from hatred and violence in the former Confederate
States.94

Unfortunately, it was not until the 1960s that discrimination against
women entered the realm of civil rights violations.9 Ironically, "sex"
was included in the 1964 Civil Rights Act as a last ditch effort by the
Act's opponents to defeat the legislation which sought to prohibit racial
discrimination in employment.9 6 Despite the inclusion of "sex," the

legislation passed and sex discrimination in employment is now
unlawful.9 7 Since 1964 Congress has enacted other legislation aimed at
protecting women from various types of gender discrimination."
Adoption of the VAWA would continue our national progress toward
eliminating discrimination of all forms by seeking to protect women from
the sex discrimination inherent in gender-based violence.

A. Title III's Language
Since the VAWA views gender-motivated violence as a form of sex
discrimination and therefore as a deprivation of the victim's civil rights,
Title III tracks the language of, and builds upon, existing civil rights
legislation. Title III reads in relevant part:
SEC. 301. CIVIL RIGHTS

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that(1) crimes motivated by the victim's gender constitute bias crimes
in violation of the victim's right to be free from discrimination on the
basis of gender;
(7) a Federal civil rights action as specified in this section is
necessary to guarantee equal protection of the laws and to reduce the
substantial adverse effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate
commerce;

94. Ken Gormley, PrivateConspiraciesand the Constitution, 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 530-31 (1985).
95. See Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). The Supreme
Court did not recognize sex discrimination as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment until 1971. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
96. See MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 1283. To the opponents of the bill, the idea of making sex
discrimination a violation of federal civil rights law was so preposterous that they naturally assumed its
insertion would lead to the defeat of the entire act. Id.
97. See supra note 95.
98. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988) (prohibiting
discrimination "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions"); Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) (prohibiting sex discrimination in
education).
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(b) RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.-AII persons within
the United States shall have the same rights, privileges and immunities
in every State as is enjoyed by all other persons to be free from crimes
of violence motivated by the victim's gender, as defined in subsection
(d).
(c) CAUSE OF ACTION.-Any person, including a person who acts
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State, who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and
thus deprives another of the rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws as enumerated in subsection (b) shall be liable
to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other
relief as the court may deem appropriate.
(d) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means any
crime of violence, as defined in [18 U.S.C. § 16], committed because
of gender or on the basis of gender ...."

The drafters of Title III clearly borrowed language from the modern day
codifications of the Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts.' 00 The

definition of "motivated by gender" given in section 301(d)(1) comes
0
directly from Title VII,"'
' 02

which uses the terms "because of sex" and

"on the basis of sex."'
Title III is not as broad as the civil rights legislation after which it is
modeled. Prior civil rights laws not only protected against violence, but
also encompassed a far broader range of rights, including protection
against the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws."'' 13 On the other hand, section 301(c) of
Title III only protects victims of gender-motivated crimes of violence. The
definition of "crimes of violence" in section 301(d)
covers, for the most
as an assault.0 4

part, only crimes which qualify

99. S.15, supra note 11, § 301.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140);
id. § 1982 (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27); id. § 1983 (originally
enacted as Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13); id. § 1985(3) (originally enacted as Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13).
101.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). See S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 50.
102. Id. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e(k).
103. Id. § 1983.
104. The term "crime of violence" is defined as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course
of committing the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988).
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Other parts of section 301 list congressional findings. Among these
findings are that federal and state criminal laws do not provide adequate
remedies for victims of gender-motivated attacks,10 5 that sex

discrimination in the criminal justice system denies victims equal
protection of the law,'0 6 and that gender-motivated violence has
significant adverse effects on interstate commerce. 07 Jurisdiction for a
exists under federal question and civil rights
Title III cause of action
08
statutes.1
jurisdictional

B. Why Title III Is Needed
1. Current Civil Rights Legislation Does Not Work for
Victims of Gender-Based Violence
The civil rights legislation currently in force in the United States is

inadequate

for

addressing

the

problem

of violent

gender-based

discrimination for two reasons. First, legislation protecting women only
applies to sex discrimination in the workplace. Second, legislation
originally enacted to protect racial minorities does not translate well when
applied to situations involving gender-based violence against women.

a. Sex Discrimination Protection in the Workplace
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is designed to prevent sex
discrimination in employment. It "provides a civil rights remedy for
gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not for gender crimes

105. S. 15, supra note 11, § 301(a)(3). This section reads: "State and Federal criminal laws do not
adequately protect against the bias element of gender-motivated crimes, which separates these crimes
from acts of random violence, nor do those laws adequately provide victims of gender-motivated crimes
Id.
I...
the opportunity to vindicate their interests .
106. Section 301(a)(4) states: "existing bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system often
deprives victims of gender-motivated crimes of equal protection of the laws and the redress to which
they are entitled .... Id. § 301(a)(4).
107. Id. § 301(a)(5)-(6). This section reads:
(5) gender-motivated violence has a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce,
by deterring potential victims from travelling interstate, from engaging in employment in
interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in
interstate commerce;
(6) gender-motivated violence has a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce,
by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing
the supply of and the demand for interstate products ....
108. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1988).
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committed on the street or in the home."' 9 In 1986, the Supreme Court
explicitly recognized in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson"0 that sex
discrimination which creates a hostile work environment is actionable
under Title VII. Using an analogy to race to make its point, the Court
said:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality
at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can
be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets."'
In the workplace, the Court equates sex discrimination with racial
discrimination. Apart from being "demeaning and disconcerting," sex
discrimination is also an arbitrary barrier to equality. Unfortunately, the
barriers to equality caused by sex discrimination do not disappear once the
woman leaves work. If eliminating sex discrimination is truly as important
as the Court suggests, the protection of women should extend beyond the
workplace. It would be both illogical and unfair to prohibit sex
discrimination at work, while allowing violent sex discrimination in other
spheres of life to continue without federal civil rights protection. Current
civil rights laws help protect racial minorities from race discrimination in
nonwork environments. Similarly, adoption of the VAWA would help to
fill the gap in current legislation which only protects women from sex
discrimination at work.
b. Race Protection Statutes Do Not Fit Gender
Shortly after the Civil War, the United States adopted legislation
designed to protect blacks from violent race discrimination by both state
officials and private parties such as the Ku Klux Klan." 2 However,
because the civil rights laws were designed to fit the particular
circumstances of blacks, not those of women, these laws are an
inappropriate remedy for victims of violent sex discrimination.
Due to the Supreme Court's narrow interpretations of post-Civil War
protective legislation, most of the early civil rights acts were useless until

109.
110.
111.
112.

S. 15, supra note 11, § 301(a)(2).
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
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the Court started taking corrective action in the 1960s and 1970s." 3 In
Monroe v. Pape,"4 the Court revitalized the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
holding that unauthorized misconduct by state officials is action taken
"under color of law"'' and is therefore actionable under section
1983.16
n7
Ten years after Monroe, the Court decided Griffin v. Breckinridge,
which dealt with private misconduct. In Griffin, the Court reinvigorated
the long-dormant section 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
holding it applicable to victims of "private conspiracies" without the
victims needing to show state action."' For a valid cause of action
under section 1985(3), the Court required that there "be some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind
the conspirators' action."" 9 Lower courts have since held that section
1985(3) extends to other classes and groups besides racial minorities,
including political, religious, and ethnic groups and women. 2 °
Sections 1983 and 1985(3) of the Ku Klux Klan Act were designed to
combat racially motivated violence. Because of the nature of gender-based
violence, these laws are not adequate for vindicating the interests of
victims of gender-motivated violence. For example, section 1985(3)
meaning more than one
requires plaintiffs to prove a conspiracy,'
wrongdoer. However, most rapes and acts of violence against women are
committed by individuals acting alone. 22 Thus, a victim of a single
rapist is unable to assert section 1985(3). Similarly, section 1983 is
Most violence
designed to redress unauthorized state misconduct.'
against women, however, is not the product of state action. Rather, women

113. During the "Dreadful Decade" from 1873 to 1883, the Supreme Court turned much of the postCivil War legislation into "decorative irrelevancies." Gormley, supra note 94, at 541.
114. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
115.42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
116. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172, 187. Prior to Monroe, a suit under § 1983 could only be brought

where the alleged violations were affirmatively authorized by statute or ordinance and hence occurred
"under color of law." See generally id.

117. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
118. Id. To have a cause of action under § 1985(3), plaintiffs must allege (1) a conspiracy, (2) "for
the purpose of depriving... any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws," (3) "an act in furtherance of the conspiracy," and (4) injury
to person or property or deprivation of any right or privilege of U.S. citizenship. Id. at 102-03.
119. Id. at 102.
120. See New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339, 1358-59 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Gormley,
supra note 94, at 550-51.
121. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
122. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at42 n.35.
123. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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are most likely to suffer violence at the hands of someone they know."'

Therefore, section 1983 is of little value to most victims of gender-based
violence.
Title III fills the holes in existing anti-discrimination legislation by
providing a cause of action specifically designed to address the types of

violence most often suffered by women. Title III does not require a
conspiracy, as does section 1985(3), and it is drafted to deal with the

problem of individual misconduct, not state misconduct as in section
1983.2 s Under section 301 of the VAWA, women would be able to
assert a civil rights claim against any person who commits a gender-

motivated crime of violence.
2. State Remedies Are Inadequate: The Problem of the Unequal
Treatment of Women in the Criminal Justice System
Survivors of sexual assault and domestic- violence not only face the

horror of being attacked, but also the fear of an unreceptive and biased
criminal justice system. From the initial contact with police to the final

decision of the judge, "[w]omen uniquely, disproportionately, and with
unacceptable frequency must endure a climate of condescension,
indifference, and hostility."'' 26 Although recent state legislative reforms
have helped, the problem remains essentially the same.

12

Women still

face both formal and informal biases in state legal systems. Title III of
the VAWA would address these biases by providing women with an
alternative forum and method for vindicating their interests.
a. Formal Barriers

Biased state laws dealing with sexual assault and domestic violence are
one example of formal barriers to gender equality in state legal systems.

124. See supra notes 39, 60-61 and accompanying text.
125. Section 301(c) of the VAWA creates the federal cause of action and reads as follows:
(c) CAUSE OF ACTION.-Any person, including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, who commits a crime of violence
motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the rights, privileges or immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws as enumerated in subsection (b) shall be liable to the party injured,
in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory
relief, and such other relief as the court may deem appropriate.
S. 15, supra note 11, § 301(c).
126. HearingsPart1,supra note 7, at 65 (statement of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund)
(quoting a "typical" finding of the New State Task Force on gender bias in the courts).
127. See ESTRICH, supra note 44, at 80-91; Torrey, supra note 8, at 1014.
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For instance, until 1990 it was legal in seven states for a husband to rape
his wife. 8 Among the states that have outlawed spousal rape, twentysix of them accord it a lesser degree of criminality, permitting prosecution
only under narrow circumstances. 29 Some states have even extended the
protection of such limited prosecution to former husbands and
cohabitants. "0
Jury instructions in rape cases are another example of formal barriers
to equality for women in state criminal systems. Lord Hale's infamous
jury instruction reads: "Rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard
to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho' never
so innocent."'' In an effort to be more neutral, many states have
abolished Hale's instruction. However, over half the states still permit a
modern version of Lord Hale's instruction, 32 and the Model Penal Code
still suggests a cautionary instruction for sexual offenses.' 33 Legal
reform of the law of rape in recent years has helped improve the situation,
134
but serious problems remain.

128. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 45 n.50; see also West, supra note 89, at 45. In 1991, four
of those seven states enacted laws making spousal rape a crime. Helaine Olen, Most States Now Ban
MaritalRape, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at A7.
129. Martha R. Burt, Rape Myths and AcquaintanceRape, in AQUAINTANCE RAPE 29 (Andrea Parrot
& Laurie Bechhoffer eds., 1991); West, supra note 89, at 46, 48.
130. West, supra note 89, at 48 n.1 1.
131. BROWNMILLER, supra note 38, at 413 (quoting MATMEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROwN (Emlyn ed. 1847) (1680)).
132. A. Thomas Morris, Note, The Empirical,Historical and Legal Case Against the Cautionary
Instruction: A Call for Legislative Reform, 1988 DUKE L.J. 154, 156. The modem version of Lord
Hale's instruction reads as follows: "A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is
one which is easily made, and, once made, difficult to defend against, even if the person accused is
innocent. Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testimony of the female... with caution."
Torrey, supra note 8, at 1045-46.
133. The Model Penal Code suggests that the jury "be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a
victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness
and the difficulty of determining the truth [of the allegation]." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 (Proposed
Official Draft 1962), quoted in Torrey, supra note 8, at 1046.
134. Thanks to legal reforms in rape law, formal requirements of corroboration have been abolished,
the crime of rape has been redefined, and a rape shield law that partially protects women from the
exposure of their past sexual history has been enacted. ESTRICH, supra note 44, at 57.
Yet, "sexism in the law of rape ... endures ... [and] supposedly dead horses continue to run."
Estrich, supra note 47, at 1091. For example, most jurisdictions, following the suggestion of the Model
Penal Code, adhere in substance to the common law "fresh complaint rule" Id. at 53-54; Torrey, supra
note 8, at 1041. The rule exists today as a rebuttable presumption against the veracity of rape victims
who do not report their assaults immediately after the incident occurs. Id. The rule continues to thrive
despite strong empirical evidence showing that because of the traumatic, personal nature of rape,
immediate reporting is not the natural reaction for rape victims. Id. at 1042. Furthermore, the purpose
of the rule is to prevent false reports, yet "[e]stimates indicate that only 2 percent of all rape reports
prove to be false, a rate comparable to the false report rate for all other crimes." Id. at 1025. In fact,
most victims never even report the crime. Id. at 1029.
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b. Informal Barriers
Even where formal barriers to gender equality have been lifted,
traditional myths and stereotypes about the victims of sexual violence still
remain. Stereotypes center on blaming the victim and questioning the
victim's credibility. Typical myths include "she asked for it"; "she
deserved it"; women mean "yes" when they say "no"; women often "cry
rape" to be vindictive; 3 5 and women fantasize about rape. 3 6 All of
these myths have been thoroughly debunked by researchers, including
those researchers most intent on questioning feminist contentions about
rape. 37 But the stereotypes still exist, and their negative effects taint the
judicial system.
Recent gender bias studies of various state court systems have
confirmed what many women were saying all along-bias against women
exists at almost every stage of the judicial process. 31 In a typical
report, the New York State Task Force on Women in the Courts concluded
that gender bias "is a pervasive problem with grave consequences. Women
are often denied equal justice, equal treatment, and equal opportunity.
Cultural stereotypes of women's role in marriage
and in society daily
39
distort courts' application of substantive law."'

Another problem with current rape statutes is that the criminal element of "force," which replaced
corroboration or nonconsent in the older rape laws, is now being judged in terms of women's resistance.
ESTRICH, supra note 44, at 60. Thus, a woman who gives in to fear or threats and does not fight to
defend herself is more likely to have an unsuccessful prosecution. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 38,
at 403 ("[R]ape is the only crime of violence in which a victim is expected or required to resist... ").
Similar to rape law, formal legal barriers still exist in the domestic violence arena. One example is
the intrafamily immunity doctrine, a common law rule which many states adopted by statute, that
prohibits tort actions between family members. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 742 (6th ed. 1990) (under
"husband-wife tort doctrine" heading). Although many states have abolished the doctrine, domestic
violence victims are still unable to collect civil damages from abusive husbands in ten states. Hearings
PartI, supra note 7, at 64.
135. The false rape myth has been debunked, and, in fact, the truth is totally the opposite-most rape
victims never even report the crime. See Torrey, supra note 8, at 1015.
136. BuRT, supra note 129, at 26-37; Torrey, supra note 8, at 1025-26.
137. Torrey, supra note 8, at 1015.
138. See supra note 86.
139. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 11, 17
(1986). For a general discussion of the prejudicial treatment women receive in the courtroom, see
generally Update: Gender Bias in the Courts, supra note 86. In domestic abuse cases, for instance, it
is not unusual for judges (or opposing attorneys) to ask the abused what she did to provoke the attack.
Hearings Part I, supra note 7, at 65. Trivialization of the harm and demeaning comments are not
uncommon. In one case, a judge told a domestic abuse victim who was seeking protection in his court:
"Let's kiss and make up and get out of my court." Id.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68:577

Discrimination against women is not limited to the courts. The historic
reluctance of police to respond seriously to private domestic
"squabbles"' 40 is well documented.' 14 Some recent reforms, such as
mandatory arrest policies and the possibility of obtaining civil protection
orders in all fifty states, have helped improve the situation for some
victims.
For rape victims who decide to report the crime, 142 police response is
often poor. After going through an "unfounding process,"'143 often
without consulting a prosecutor, many times the police decide that actual
rapes never occurred. 44 In Oakland, California, for example, 228 rape
cases were reopened for investigation when it was disclosed that one of
every four rapes
and attempted rapes in 1989 were classified by police as
,,unfounded." ' 14 1
Exposing both the formal and informal biases that exist in state judicial
systems illustrates that state criminal and civil remedies are inadequate for
dealing with some of the most serious crimes suffered by women. In
addition, the barriers women face, "barriers of law, of practice, and of
prejudice[, are] not shared by other crime victims.' 1 46 Title III of the

140. Most domestic violence incidents are not simply "squabbles." The National Institute of Justice
estimates that if domestic violence were fully reported, one-third of the incidents "would be classified
as felony rape, robbery, or aggravated assault; the remaining two-thirds .involve bodily injury at least
as serious as the injury inflicted in 90 percent of all robberies and aggravated assaults." S. REP. No. 197,
supra note 1I,at 38 (relying on PETER FINN, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS:
LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT, at 4 (1990)). Many victims of domestic
violence are murdered-one-third of all women murdered in the U.S. die at the hands of present or
former husbands or boyfriends. Id.
141. See MARTIN, supra note 15, at 91-100; NOW KIT, supra note 55, at 25; RHODE, supranote 15,
at 239; Delbert S. Elliot, CriminalJustice Processin Family Violence Crimes, in FAMILY VIOLENCE
427, 428 (Lloyd Ohlin & Michael Tonry eds., 1989); Martin, supra note 66, at 6; see, e.g., Thurman
v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D.Conn. 1984) (involving a woman who was stabbed 13
times by her husband while police were on the scene).
142. Of all major crimes, including burglary, robbery, and assault, rape is the most underreported;
it is estimated that only seven percent of all rapes are reported to police. See supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
143. The "unfounding process" occurs when police independently evaluate the evidence, including
the perceived credibility of the accuser, and decide whether or not to pursue charges. ESTRICH, supra
note 44, at 15-16; RUSSELL, EXPLOITATION, supranote 44, at 29-30; Torrey, supra note 8, at 1028-29.
A classification of "unfounded" basically means the police determine that the crime never occurred.
Prosecution Seen As Unlikely in 228 Rape Cases in Oakland, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1990, at B10.
144. ESTRICH, supra note 44, at 15-16; RUSSELL, EXPLOITATION, supra note 44, at 29-30; Torrey,
supra note 8, at 1028.
145. Prosecution Seen As Unlikely in 228 Rape Cases in Oakland, supra note 143, at B0. The
Oakland incident is particularly disturbing because some of the victims were never even interviewed
after the initial rape report; yet, subsequent investigations found that 79 of the 112 reported cases
reviewed thus far did in fact occur. Id.
146. S. REP. NO. 197, supra note 11, at 43.
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VAWA, which would create a federal civil rights cause of action, is
needed to remedy state law deficiencies and to provide women with the
opportunity for protection from gender-based assaults.
C. Advantages of a Civil Rights Claim
Adoption of Title III of the VAWA would help address the inequalities
faced by women in state court systems by providing a civil rights action
with federal court jurisdiction. This would help the women who are
targeted for violence on the basis of sex in two ways. First, a federal civil
rights action is different from, and superior to, a state criminal (or civil)
action. Second, the federal court system, while not perfect, is a better
forum for the adjudication of federal rights.
1. Federal Civil Rights Remedy
Like other civil rights legislation, a Title III "civil rights claim
redresses an assault on a commonly shared ideal of equality."' 4 7 State
criminal proceedings, on the other hand, are not concerned with equality,
but with individual criminal acts. 48 Criminal sexual assault trials far too
often blame the victim by centering on her manner of dress or amount of
resistance, 49 instead of focusing attention on the wrongfulness of the
assailant's actions. 5 1 More importantly, the plaintiff-victim in a civil
rights action would be in charge of the litigation, not the police or a state
prosecutor. The ability of the victim to decide when to pursue a claim,
when to settle, and how to run the litigation would return to the victim
some of the feelings of control and power that are commonly lost in
gender-motivated attacks and in any subsequent criminal proceedings."'
Finally, in a criminal prosecution, the burden of proof is "beyond a
reasonable doubt." A victim suing civilly under Title III, on the other
hand, would face the same burden of proof as other civil litigants-she

147. Id. at 49.
148. Id.; see also Hearings Part I, supra note 7, at 69 (statement of NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund) ("[V]iolence motivated by gender is not merely an individual crime or a personal
injury, but is a form of discrimination, an assault on a publicly-shared ideal of equality.").
149. See ESTRICH, supra note 44, at 57, 60.
150. NOW LDEF, supra note 34, at 2.
151. Fernandez, supra note 41, at 287 (asserting that attacks based on immutable characteristics
"result, many times, in a feeling on the part of the victim of 'no control' over his or her life").
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would only have to prove her case by a "preponderance of the
1 52
evidence."'
The use of civil remedies by sexual assault victims has received
increased attention in recent years.' 53 "[T]he tendency of police to
discourage rape complaints, the frequency of negotiated pleas to lesser
offenses, and the token sentences meted out to rapists combine to make
the sexual assault victim highly dissatisfied with [the] criminal justice
system."' 5 4 By turning to the civil suit, the victim seeks selfconfirmation of the seriousness of the offense, and simultaneously hopes
that substantial compensatory and punitive damages will educate the
assailant as to the gravity of his offense.' 5 5
A federal civil rights claim would also improve on traditional state civil
tort claims. The very act of making gender-based assaults a "federal
offense" communicates, to assailant and victim alike, the seriousness of
the crime. Victims bringing a civil rights action would no longer face the
barriers presented by outdated state laws or common law doctrines, such
as the intrafamily immunity doctrine. 5 6 For example, under Title III, a
victim of gender-motivated domestic violence could not only receive a
civil protection order, but she could also sue a spouse or other assailant
for compensatory and punitive damages."'
2. Federal Forum
During the Reconstruction, Congress passed the original post-war civil
rights legislation "in response to the unwillingness or inability of the state
governments to enforce their own laws against those violating the civil
rights of others."' 58 The situation of women in the courts today,
particularly in cases dealing with violence, is analogous; the barriers to
equality, the biases, and other "defect[s] in the administration of the laws

152. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 28.
153. See Camille LeGrand & Frances Leonard, Civil Suits for Sexual Assault: CompensatingRape
Victims, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 479 (1979); Gail M. Ballou, Note, Recoursefor Rape Victims:
Third PartyLiability, 4 HARv. WOM. L.J. 105 (1981); Holly J. Manley, Comment, Civil Compensation
for the Victim ofRape, 7 COOLEY L. REV. 193 (1990); Maureen Balleza, Many Rape Victims Finding
Justice Through Civil Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al, B7.
154. LeGrand & Leonard, supra note 153, at 480.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 134.
157. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that section 301(c) of Title HI allows "for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief
as the court may deem appropriate").
158. D.C. v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 426 (1973) (footnote omitted).

1993]

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT

[do] not extend to other cases."' 9 Women are uniquely and
disproportionately disadvantaged. 61 Providing a civil rights claim that
would be litigated in federal court, under federal law, helps to alleviate
some of the inequalities women face.
In the past, when Congress has created new federal rights, it has relied
on the federal courts because:
The United States
the county courts;
their sympathies
vicinage; ...they

courts are further above mere local influence than
their judges can act with more independence....
are not so nearly identified with those of the
will be able to rise above prejudices or bad passions

.... We believe 6that we can trust our United States courts, and we

propose to do

so.' '

For similar reasons, women bringing suit under Title III would have the
opportunity to bring suit in federal court, thereby avoiding the "prejudices
or bad passions" of state systems.
Federal judges obviously are not infallible or completely immune to the
cultural forces and gender stereotypes that cause gender bias in state legal
systems. 62 However, as with civil rights legislation aimed at protecting
racial minorities, it is fair to assume that the federal system would
provide litigants a better opportunity to assert their rights than would state
courts. 63 In fact, the recently released sex bias survey of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals shows that many of the women surveyed found
"the federal courts are relatively free of164the kind of blatant sexism they
have encountered in some state courts."'

159. Id. at 426 (quoting Indiana Senator Pratt's comments during congressional debate on the Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871).
160. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 44.
161. Carter, 409 U.S. at 428 (quoting legislative history which contained the comments of
Congressman Cobum explaining the need for federal court jurisdiction over actions under the 1871 Civil
Rights Act).
162. For example, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit has written that "rape appears to be primarily
a substitute for consensual intercourse rather than a manifestation of male hostility ...."
"iCHARD A.
POSNER, SEx AND REASON 384 (1992). For a critique of Posner's views, see Lynne Henderson,
Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 427-28 (1991). Of all the federal judicial
circuits, only the Ninth Circuit has any results from its sex-bias survey. Court that Attacks Sex Bias Is
Reported Often Guilty ofIt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992, at A17. Although the Ninth Circuit study shows
that 60% of women reported some type of unwanted sexual attention in the last five years, only 6%
attributed the harassment to a judge. 9th Circuit Studies Gender Bias, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 30. In
fact, "most lawyers in the circuit, male and female, believe they have been treated fairly by judges in
the courtroom." Id.
163. Hearings PartI, supra note 7, at 68 (noting a "higher rate of success in cases of racial violence
...tried under federal civil rights laws rather than in state court").
164. 9th Circuit Studies Gender Bias, supra note 162, at 30; see also supra note 162.
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There are several specific reasons why the federal courts are a better
forum for plaintiffs seeking redress for civil rights violations. First, a
federal forum makes "antiquated State procedural rules ...irrelevant and
local immunities inapplicable."'' 65 The "fresh complaint rule,"' 66" for
example, would no longer be a barrier to victims suffering from rape
trauma syndrome who fail to report their claim immediately. 6 7 Second,
the small number of positions available on the federal bench permits the
selection of highly competent judges168-judges who, at least in theory,
should be better suited to administer the laws in a neutral,
nondiscriminatory manner. Third, federal judges are aware of the special
tradition surrounding their posts; this awareness "instill[s] elan and a
sense of mission ... and exert[s] ... a palpable influence on the quality
of the judicial product."'6 9 Finally, federal judges with life tenure are
insulated from local political pressures, biases, and other majoritarian
concerns faced by elected or appointed state judges. 17' This may allow
them to perform their duties with less bias than that found in state court
judges. Any one of these reasons taken alone may not be conclusive.
However, when taken in the aggregate, one could reasonably conclude that
a federal forum would provide civil rights plaintiffs a better opportunity
to vindicate their interests than is currently available in state judicial
systems. In fact, it seems that Congress itself has reached that conclusion
by enacting statutes that provide federal jurisdiction for civil rights

claims. 171
IV. TITLE III COVERAGE
Since the introduction of the VAWA in 1990,172 there has been
considerable controversy over the scope of its civil rights provision,7
Would random muggings, all domestic abuse cases, and other assaults on

165. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 48.
166. See supra note 134.
167. See supra note 134. Waiting a long period of time before reporting a gender-motivated assault
may present the same evidentiary problems in the civil setting as it does in the criminal setting.
However, the presumption against the victim would not be as strong in civil cases where the burden of
proof is only a "preponderance of the evidence."
168. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1121 (1977). For example, the
State of California has almost two times as many judges as the entire federal judiciary. Id.
169. Id. at 1124.
170. Hearings PartI, supra note 7, at 68; Neuborne, supra note 168, at 1127-28.
171. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1443 (1988).
172. See supra note 11 for a history of the Violence Against Women Act.
173. See infra part IV.B for a discussion of opposition to the VAWA.
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women be actionable in federal court? The language and legislative
history of section 301 directly address these concerns; Title III "is a
discrimination statute, not a felony protection bill."'74 To have a
successful claim under section 301, a plaintiff would need to allege and
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) any person (2)
committed a crime of violence (3) motivated by gender.
Title III is designed primarily to address violence committed by
individuals, the most common type of violence faced by women.' 75 The
"under color of law" reference in the statute is meant to allow suits
against governmental entities or state actors only when such suits are
allowed under current civil rights law.' 76
The second element, "crime of violence," is perhaps the broadest
element of the entire offense. The statute defines crime of violence by
reference to the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16, which includes felonies
involving a substantial risk of the use of force and any other "offense that
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another . . . ."7' The conclusion
of some groups that Title III would cover a wide array of violent
conduct17 is correct, but only to the extent that such crimes are
motivated by gender.
The third element, "motivated by gender," is based on Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964."9 Proof of motivation for a particular act of
violence would proceed as it currently does under Title VII and other civil
rights legislation-by looking at the "totality of the circumstances." ' 0
For several decades, the courts have successfully used circumstantial
evidence to determine racial bias under existing civil rights laws, and they
should be able to use the same methods to show gender bias.'
The recent growth of violence motivated by group prejudice has led to
the development of federal legislation mandating record keeping on "hate

174. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 48. Title III has a specific limitation prohibiting a cause of
action for "random acts of violence unrelated to gender or for acts that cannot be demonstrated, by a
preponderance of the evidence, to be 'motivated by gender'...." Id. at 28.
175. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
176. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 52.
177. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1988).
178. Judicial Conference of the United States, Violence Against Women, Sept. 25, 1991 (unpublished
Resolution) (on file with author); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, News Release, Judicial
Conference Opposes Expanded Role for Federal Courts, Sept. 25, 1991, at 2 [hereinafter News Release]
(on file with author).
179. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
180. S.REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 50.
181. Id.
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The Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990183 (Hate Crime Act)

mandates the collection of data on "crimes that manifest evidence of
prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity
... ,,"84 Neither gender nor sex is included as a category under the
Hate Crime Act. The stated reason why Congress excluded gender as a
category under the new law is its belief that inclusion would not improve
current data collection on crimes of violence against women.' S1 Since
1990, the FBI has established draft guidelines to implement the Hate
Crime Act. 186 The guidelines list thirteen representative "facts" that
would typically be used as circumstantial evidence to prove a crime is
motivated by racial bias or other group prejudice.' 8 7 The same factual
circumstances that may show racial bias are easily adaptable to prove a
crime is motivated by gender as required under the VAWA. The FBI
guidelines include the following illustrative facts:
(a) The offender and the victim were of different racial, religious,
ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation groups. For example, the
victim was black and the offenders were white.
(b) Bias-related oral comments, written statements, or gestures were
made by the offender which indicates his/her bias. For example, the
offender called the victin a "kike."
(c) Bias-related drawings, markings, symbols, or graffiti were left at
the crime scene. For example, a swastika was painted on the door of a
synagogue.
(d) Certain objects, items, or things which indicate bias were used
(e.g., the offenders wore white sheets with hoods covering their faces)
or left behind by the offender(s) (e.g., a burning cross was left in front
of the victim's residence).
(g) Several incidents have occurred in the same locality, at or about the
same time, and the victims are all of the same racial, religious,
ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation group.

182. See Fernandez, supra note 41, at 282.
183. 28 U.S.C.S. § 534 (Law. Co-op 1992).
184. Id.
185. Fernandez, supra note 41, at 275. How Congress could believe this in light of acknowledged
evidence of severe underreporting of sex crimes is not explained. See supranote 52 and accompanying
text. Congress also felt more hearings were needed to examine the deficiencies in current data collection
methods for gender-based crimes. Fernandez, supra note 41, at 275.
186. See Fernandez, supra note 41, at 285. For a complete copy of the draft guidelines, see FBI, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM

CRIME REPORTING SUMMARY REPORTING

SYSTEM AND NATIONAL

INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM: DRAFT HATE CRIME DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES

187. Fernandez, supra note 41, at 285 n.129.

(1990).

1993]

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT

(i) The victim was engaged in activities promoting his/her racial,
religious, ethnic/national origin, or sexual orientation group. For
example, the victim is a member of the NAACP, participated in gay
rights demonstrations, etc.
(k) The offender was previously involved in a similar hate crime or is
a member of a hate group.
(1) There were indications that a hate group was involved. For example,
a hate group claimed responsibility for the crime or was active in the
neighborhood.
(m) A historically established animosity exists between the victim
group and the offender group. 88

Three additional items that are not on the FBI list, but that are useful
in evaluating racial or other group bias include: (1) lack of
provocation,'8 9 (2) absence of apparent motive, and (3) severity of

188. Id. The four items listed below are excluded from the textual list because they do not easily
translate to situations involving gender-motivated crimes:
(e) The victim is the member of a racial, religious, ethnic/national origin, or sexual
orientation group which is overwhelmingly outnumbered by members of another group
in the neighborhood where the victim lives and the incident took place.
(f) The victim was visiting a neighborhood where previous hate crimes had been
committed against other members of his/her racial, ethnic/national origin, or sexual
orientation group and where tensions remain high against his or her group.
(h) A substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred perceives that the
incident was motivated by bias.
(j) The incident coincided with a holiday relating to, or a date of particular significance
to, a racial, religious, ethnic/national origin group (e.g., Martin Luther King Day, Rosh
Hashanah, etc.).
Id.

The nontranslation of these four "fact circumstances" from racial bias to gender bias is partly
explainable due to the fact that women are not a discrete, insular minority in the United States.
However, experience has shown that discrete, insular minority status is not a prerequisite to gender bias.
See e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
189. While I find this factor is very useful, its use in domestic violence and rape scenarios may
present problems for people whose definition of what constitutes sufficient "provocation" differs from
mine. For example, as a society we have determined that walking through a white neighborhood is
insufficient provocation for beating a black person. The crime would be generally denounced as racially
motivated. Perhaps 50 years ago the same crime would have been viewed differently by whites because
the victim violated what many considered well-established societal rules.
The situation with women today is similar to the situation of blacks about 50 years ago. For example,
some people might consider a woman going out to a bar alone wearing a short skirt and a scanty top
as sufficient "provocation" to engage in rape or acquaintance rape if the man is invited back to her
apartment. Similarly, in domestic violence situations, there are a wide variety of "reasons" why men are
"provoked" to beat their wives and girlfriends. See MARTIN, supra note 15, at 29-32.
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attack. 9 ' I will refer to these three items and the nine FBI items
collectively as "bias indicators."' 9 '
Many of the acts of violence women face today contain a number of the
bias indicators listed above. It is important to realize that any one of these
indicators taken alone will probably not be sufficient to show gender bias,
or in the case of Title III, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a given attack was motivated by gender. However, if the evidence
shows the existence of several of these indicators in a single incident, a
court or jury could reasonably conclude, as currently occurs in many
discrimination cases, 9 2 that the totality of the circumstances shows that
the attack was motivated by gender. An analysis of several possible
scenarios using the bias indicators listed above suggests that Title III
would not cover random muggings, but that it would cover many instances
of rape and some cases of domestic violence.
A. Potential Scenarios
1. Muggings
A woman is mugged by a male attacker while walking home from work
one evening. The woman is hit and shoved to the ground, called a "stupid
bitch," and has her purse stolen. Using the bias indicators under this set
of facts, it would be difficult or impossible to show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the attack was motivated by gender.
First, there is a clear motive for the attack (indicator 2)-robbery, not
gender bias. This fact alone is extremely persuasive even though several
of the bias indicators are present (i.e., different sexes (indicator a) and
bias-related language (indicator b)). Second, although the attacker might
have a history of such offenses (indicator k), his prior victims most likely
include both men and women. Thus, this hypothetical mugging cannot be
considered an incident motivated by gender.' 93 Finally, although the
woman was hit and shoved to the ground, the mugging was not performed

190. See COPELAND & WOLFE, supra note 40, at 9 (citing Peter Finn, Bias Crime: A Special Target
for Prosecutors,THE PROSECUTOR 14 (Spring 1988)); NOW LDEF, supra note 34, at 2; see, e.g., S.
REP. NO. 197, supra note 11, at 50.
191. To facilitate discussion in the text, this Note refers to the FBI items by their letters (i.e., bias
indicator m), and refers to the additional three items by their numbers (i.e., bias indicator 3).
192. S. REP. NO. 197, supra note 11, at 50.
193. Even if this mugger has a prior history of robbing only women because they are easier targets,
the apparent motive (indicator 2) is still robbery, not gender bias.

1993]

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT

with the type of severity (indicator 3) that might indicate gender bias.' 94
In conclusion, most random muggings do not show enough evidence of
gender bias to be covered under Title III. 'g

2. Aggravated Rape
Aggravated rape, also known as "stranger rape" or "real rape," usually
involves an unknown assailant and includes the use of weapons and
beatings.1 6 This situation is a relatively easy one to classify as falling
under the specifications of Title III. Take a scenario similar to the one
used above. The same woman walking home from work is attacked and
dragged into some nearby woods where she is raped and severely beaten
by a serial rapist who hurls sexist epithets at her.' 97 If the attacker is
caught, the victim would likely be able to show that the violence was
motivated by gender.
First, the victim is a woman and the attacker a man (indicator a).

Second, the sexist epithets and slurs are clearly bias related (indicator b).
The use of bias language, such as whore, slut, bitch, or something more
offensive, is obviously not, by itself, dispositive and readily indicates
nothing more than a foul mouth. In context, however, the use of sexist
language lends coherence to a characterization of the overall nature of the
attack. Third, the motive for the attack (indicator 2) is clearly not robbery,
but rape, a definitive act of gender bias. 19 Fourth, the victim may be
able to show the prior rape history of the assailant (indicator k). Showing
that the perpetrator has a prior history -of attacking and raping only

194. See COPELAND & WOLFE, supra note 40, at 10. Mutilation and torture often characterize biasrelated violence. Id.
195. The drafters of the VAWA have made it very clear that they did not intend for random
muggings to be covered by Title III. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 48.
196. See ESTRICH, supra note 44, at 3-4.
197. This is a close approximation of the hypothetical used in the Senate Report to illustrate an
"obvious" Title III case. See S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 50.
198. Even if the rapist also stole something from the victim, the totality of the circumstances would
probably show that the rape was motivated by gender. See Infra note 202.
The drafters of the VAWA have been careful to suggest that Title III would not create a "Federal tort
law" for all rapes. See S. REP.No. 197, supra note 11, at 49 (referring to Griffin v. Breckinridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). Rather, Title IMlwould only cover those rapes that victims can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence were motivated by gender. Id. However, most rapes would apparently
be per se violations of Title III since Congress broadly defined "motivated by gender" as "because of'
or "on the basis of' gender. Id. at 28; see infra note 204. If the assailant has a habit of raping both men
and women, it might be more difficult to show the rape was motivated by gender. See supra text
accompanying note 188 (listing bias indicators a, g, k, and m).
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women is additional evidence of gender bias.' 99 In conclusion, any one
of these indicators alone may not show that a particular act was motivated
by gender. However, the combination of all these factors strongly suggests
violence motivated by nothing other than the victim's gender.
Accordingly, Title III would cover such an act of violence.

3. Acquaintance Rape
The analysis of a scenario of acquaintance or date rape is similar to that
of stranger rape. Take, for example, the situation of a female college
student who accepts an offer from a male "friend" at a party to walk her
to her dorm room. Once there, he grabs the woman, rips off her clothes,
and forcibly rapes her. The shocked student does not report the rape to
police. It is later discovered that the perpetrator has since raped at least
three other women in a similar manner. 0 0
Proving gender bias in this case may initially appear more difficult than
in the case of stranger rape. A thorough analysis suggests, however, that
Title III would probably cover this case. Proving gender bias in this
situation should be no more difficult than proving racial bias in an
analogous case. For example, if a white student had attacked and beaten
four different black students on four separate occasions with no
provocation and without monetary motive, would anyone question the

199. Bias indicator k is likely to be present in many rape situations because of the high rate of
recidivism among rapists. Susan Rasky, Bill on Sex Crime Assessed in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1990, at A19 (relying on Linda Fairstein, chief of the Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit in the New York
District Attorney's Office) ("[C]onvicted rapists [have] the highest recidivism rate of any criminals.");
Elsa Walsh, Health ProfessionalsDiscuss Sexual Abuse, WASH. POST, June 5, 1980, at 10 ("[R]apists
demonstrate one of the highest recidivism rates of all criminal offenders-35 percent.").
In many rape situations, the victim may be able to present evidence of numerous other bias indicators.
For example, she may be able to show that several other incidents of rape have occurred at the same
time (i.e., night), around the same place (i.e., a local park), and that all the other victims are women
(indicator g).
Indicator d involves bias-related objects. Many feminists argue that pornography is a violation of
women's civil rights. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985). Under this theory, if pornography is linked with an attack, it would
be evidence of gender bias under indicator d. This appears plausible since some sex offenders are avid
consumers of pornography. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 38, at 442-45.
Finally, indicator 3 suggests that the severity of the attack and excessive violence may show
something about the motive of the attacker. See COPELAND & WOLFE, supra note 40, at 10. This
indicator may be useful in rapes where the attacker violates his victim with bottles, sticks, or other
foreign objects. BROWNMILLER, supra note 38, at 212-14. Such behavior is not uncommon in sexual
assaults. Id. Senseless victim mutilation would also suggest bias. See COPELAND & WOLFE, supra note
40, at 10.
200. This scenario is based on the testimony of a student who appeared at hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. See Hearings PartII, supra note 4, at 5-6.
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reasons for the attacks? Racial prejudice would be assumed instantly. A

similar assumption of gender bias should occur when women are attacked
and raped without provocation and for no apparent motive.2 °'
In a typical date-rape scenario, gender bias is fairly evident. The
perpetrator, a man, has a history of attacking and raping women, and only

women (indicators a, g, and k). As in the case of racial attacks, the
history of the attacker and the fact that he picks victims from one group
should carry heavy weight. Second, there was no apparent motive for the

attack other than gender bias (indicator 2). The attacker did not steal
anything from the victim, for example.2 °2 Finally, there was no
provocation for the attack (indicator 1). Visiting someone's dorm room
after a date, wearing "sexy" clothing, going out to a bar alone, or even
initiating sexual contact and then saying "no" should not be considered

"offenses" which justify rape. The typical male response-"she asked for

it by inviting me to her room"-is no longer acceptable. 213 Indeed, one
of the main purposes of the VAWA is to overcome the traditional
stereotypes that have for so long legitimized violence against women in
these circumstances. 2 4 It must be made clear that women have the same
civil rights as men to "behav[e] as though they [are] free. 20 5
Rape is the epitome of misogyny. The development of case law under

the VAWA should eventually, if not immediately, lead to the conclusion
201. Rape is to women what lynching is to blacks, a form of violent discrimination. See infra note
207. Accordingly, a rapist claiming he was provoked by a woman's attire or motivated by sexual desire
is as ridiculous as a white person claiming he was provoked or motivated to lynch a black man not
because of racial bias, but because the victim looked at him the wrong way or because the offender had
a particularly frustrating day and needed to vent his frustrations. See also infra notes 202-08 and
accompanying text.
202. Even if a theft did occur, this fact alone does not end the inquiry. The question is not simply
what happened, but what was the attacker's motive for acting as he did. Raping a person is not the
normal way of accomplishing a robbery. The rape itself carries significance apart from any theft that
may occur as an afterthought of the attack. Even if the main objective of an attack is robbery, the victim
could still presumably show that the motive for the act of rape was gender bias. See supra note 198.
203. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 39. Under Title III, a victim would still have to show that
she was in fact the victim of a violent attack or rape. To the extent that the victim's actions, such as
inviting a date to her apartment, impinge upon her credibility when she claims that she was raped,
traditional stereotypes about victim-blaming would probably continue to exist. However, once a victim
shows that she was in fact raped, it should be relatively easy to show that the rape was motivated by
gender bias. See supra note 198; infra text accompanying notes 206-07.
204. See S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 47-48; see, e.g., id. at 39 (discussing the need to change
pervasive victim-blaming attitudes like "she asked for it."). If courts used a male proclamation of sexual
provocation (e.g., "She asked for it by wearing that short skirt.') as anything other than evidence of
gender bias, the main purpose of the Act would be defeated. Section 301(d)(1) of the VAWA and its
legislative history make very clear that violence committed "because of sex" is considered gender-biased
violence and is thus actionable under the Act. See supra note 198.
205. GIFFiN, supra note 32, at 23. For full quote, see supra text accompanying note 45.
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that rape is a per se act of gender bias.20 6 If a woman proves rape, a
rebuttable presumption of gender bias should arise, shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant. This is more a question of common sense than
judicial innovation. If a cross is burned in the front lawn of a black
family, does anyone question the motive of the perpetrator? Perhaps a
better analogy is lynching. 0 7 The history of race relations in this
country and the historical significance of lynching leave little doubt as to
the racist motives of the perpetrators.0 8 Similarly, this country has a
history of sexual inequality and violence against women, 2 9 which
provides ample evidence to conclude that rape is a continuing legacy of
historical sexism and gender bias.
4. Domestic Violence
The final category to be explored is domestic violence. Assume a man
with a prior history of abusing his girlfriends gets married. The man
regularly beats his wife over the course of several years. Numerous times
the beatings result in injuries requiring hospital visits. The police respond
to calls on several occasions, but no arrests are ever made. 2' 0 The
husband beats his wife for various reasons, ranging from the grand ("You
are a rotten wife/mother") to the trivial (breaking an egg yolk while
cooking breakfast). 21 ' Finally, the woman leaves her husband
permanently after a particularly severe beating, and she seeks to recover
damages under Title III.
It should be possible for the woman to prove that the violence was
motivated by gender in this scenario because many of the bias indicators
are present.212 First, at the societal level, there is a well-documented
historical "animosity" between the victim group, abused wives, and the

206. See supra note 198.
207. This analogy has been used by others. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 6, at 1303 ("[S]exual
assault in the United States today resembles lynching prior to its recognition as a civil rights violation.
It is a violent humiliation ritual ....').
208. This analogy to race is not meant to trivialize the racism faced by blacks in this country. Rather,
the purpose is to illuminate the problem of sexism by making an analogy to racism, a problem with
which many readers may be more familiar. See also supra note 13.
209. See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
210. Section 301(e)(2) of the VAWA specifically notes that "[n]othing in this section requires a prior
criminal complaint, prosecution, or conviction to establish the necessary elements of a cause of action."
S. 15, supra note 11, § 301(e)(2).
211. See, e.g., MARTIN, supranote 15, at 50 ("One woman.. .was beaten unmercifully for breaking
the egg yolk while cooking her husband's breakfast.").
212. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (discussing the bias indicators).
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offender group, abusive husbands (indicators a and in). "Animosity" may
not be the most applicable word, but domination, subjugation, and
oppression are fitting. 1 3 Second, bias-related language and verbal abuse
are both integral parts of the cycle of domestic violence (indicator b).2" 4
Third, the attacker here has a history of prior incidents of a similar nature
(indicator k), both with his wife and other women (indicator g). Fourth,
the attacks generally occur in the same locality (the home), around the
same time (when the husband returns from work), with unnecessary
severity and absent any apparent motive or provocation (indicators g, 1,
2, and 3). Finally, many women are beaten when they take jobs outside
the home, when they express a desire to visit friends or family, or when
they simply leave the house (indicator f). 215 Visiting friends or family,
or simply leaving one's home does not exactly fit indicator i because the
victim is not engaging in activities promoting her self-interest.216
However, such actions could certainly be classified as acts of
independence and self-assertion-acts that express a woman's right to
freedom and to responsibilities outside the home. From the abuser's point
of view, the woman is abrogating her duties in the household, and this is
sufficient cause for abuse.2 17
Putting all these indicators together, a court could clearly find from the
totality of the circumstances that some cases of domestic violence are
motivated by gender. When a cycle of beatings occurs over the course of
several months or years, it seems clear that the actions of the victimized
spouse are not the true cause of the violence. Rather, the spouse, usually
the wife,2 t is beaten because she is a woman and is therefore seen as
an acceptable outlet for male violence and aggression.2" 9
Domestic violence cases would probably create more difficulty under
Title III than rape cases. It would be harder for the victim to prove that
the violence was motivated by gender because the issue of provocation
(indicator 1) is harder to assess. 22" For example, in the domestic
violence scenario above, hopefully most people would agree that breaking
213. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
214. See MARTIN, supra note 15, at 78.

215. Id. at 85.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See supra text accompanying note 188.
See MARTIN, supra note 15, at 78.
See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 45 (discussing legalized violence against married

women).

220. For a discussion of provocation in rape cases, see supra note 189 (discussing the theoretical
problems involved with the "provocation" indicator).
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the yolk of an egg is insufficient provocation for violent behavior. Given
all the other bias indicators present in this case, a court could logically
conclude that the victim proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the beating was motivated by gender. It is unclear, however, when a court
or jury would decide that a given beating was "justified" by something
other than gender bias.22'
Courts should examine evidence of provocation in light of the purposes
of the Act. The VAWA seeks to provide women the opportunity to assert
their right to be free, like all other citizens, from violence.222 The Act
seeks to undo the numbness that has resulted from the immensity and
ubiquity of violence against women.223 With knowledge of this
legislative intent, evidence that a man beats his wife for trivial matters
should be considered strong evidence of gender bias. Evidence of more
"serious" provocation must be carefully evaluated in conjunction with
other bias indicators. The exact parameters of what constitutes domestic
violence actionable under Title III would be developed in the case law.

B. Opposition to the VAWA
The idea of creating a federal civil rights claim for the potential use of
victims of domestic violence and other gender-motivated crimes has
sparked the attention and opposition of many, including the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, William H. Rehnquist. 224 Opposition to the
VAWA stems mainly from the fear of (1) overwhelming an already
heavily burdened federal court system, 225 and (2) involving federal
221. For example, take the case of a man who severely beats his wife after she accidentally breaks
his new camera. Though many of us would find a beating under any circumstances deplorable, the
defendant in a Title III claim might argue that he beat his wife not because of her gender, but because
of the accident. Depending on the presence of other bias indicators, the plaintiff may or may not succeed
in showing that the beating was motivated by gender.
222. See S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 33-35.
223. Id. at 38.
224. See Richard Carelli, Rehnquist Sees Harm in Making a FederalCase ofIt, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Jan. 1, 1992, at Al1; Ann Pelham, Domestic Relations in FederalCourt, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 21, 1991,
at 7; Rosie Sherman, Fears Expressedon Proposed Bill to Aid Women, NAT'L L.J., June 3, 1991, at 3,
16; News Release, supra note 178, at I; see also S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 48.
225. News Release, supra note 178, at 2. Echoing traditional police reluctance to become involved
in domestic squabbles, the Judicial Conference expressed its fear that the VAWA would involve federal
courts in "domestic relations disputes." Id. The proponents of the VAWA, however, including Senator
Biden, realize that "battering is a crime of force, not of domestic discord." Women's Concerns,Senators'
Promises,BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 1991, at 18 (quoting Sen. Biden); see also supra text accompanying
notes 60-69; supra note 140.
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courts in areas traditionally covered by state law. 226 Neither of these

reasons is sufficient to refuse victims of discriminatory violence an
opportunity to vindicate their interests in federal court.

1. Overburdening Federal Courts
Congress recognized the problem of overburdened federal court civil
dockets in the recently enacted Civil Justice Reform Act. 227 However,

by adopting the VAWA, Congress would also be recognizing and
attempting to solve a very serious problem by creating a federal civil
rights claim for certain victims of violent sex discrimination. The fact that

federal courts would potentially face more civil rights actions should not
be sufficient to undermine the legislation. If the passage of new civil
rights laws hinged on the potential increased burden on federal courts, we
would have no new legislation. Therefore, despite increased administrative
burdens on federal courts, Congress should continue to enact legislation

like the VAWA, which is necessary to redress discriminatory violations
made against half of our population's civil rights.228
2. Cases Traditionally Covered by State Law
Many opponents of the VAWA fear that the federal courts will become

involved in areas traditionally covered by state law, namely "domestic
relations disputes. '"229 This argument reveals in part the opponents'
general lack of understanding of gender-motivated violence; they
underestimate both the nature and brutality of domestic violence.2 30

Most cases rise to a level far above what opponents have called "domestic
relations

disputes. "231

They

are

serious acts

of violence232 often

226. See News Release, supra note 178, at 1; S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 49.
227. Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 178.
228. The potential for an increased burden on the federal judicial system did not result in the defeat
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12,101-12,213, 47 U.S.C. § 225). Similarly, anti-discrimination legislation for victims of gendermotivated violence should not be defeated because of administrative burdens.
229. See News Release, supra note 178, at 2; Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note
178.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 60-69; supra note 140.
231. See supra note 225. Referring to domestic violence as "domestic relations disputes" underscores
opponents' lack of knowledge about the problem of violence against women. A cynic might even view
the use of such terminology as an attempt to trivialize the problem and undermine support for the
VAWA. Either way, it is a fine illustration of the historical reluctance of society to recognize as serious
a class of violence simply because it occurs against women and within the confines of the home.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63; supra notes 69, 140.
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committed under circumstances indicating gender bias. The failure of
traditional state remedies to solve the problem has already been discussed
above.233 Besides, the existence of state remedies, even if they were
adequate, should not be sufficient to preclude civil rights legislation. Most
civil rights laws on the books today covers some area traditionally
covered by state law.234
Another important issue underestimated by those opposed to the Act is
that the VAWA is limited to combatting violence motivated by gender. It
does not provide a remedy for every assault or act of domestic
violence.2 35 Nor does the Act override state tort law or create a "general
federal tort law.1 236 It simply treats gender-motivated violence in much
the same way as racially motivated violence is treated under other civil
rights laws.237 If a particular case (or class of cases) involving domestic
violence falls under the heading "gender-motivated violence," then it
would be covered by the Act. If passed, the VAWA would certainly
increase the number of civil rights cases that federal courts would be
required to hear. However, when violations of civil rights are involved,
"caseload considerations are necessarily secondary to the vindication of
those rights. 2 38

233. See supra notes 126-46 and accompanying text.
234. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 49.
235. Opponents point out that the definition of "crime of violence motivated by gender" in §
301(d)(1) is broad and may encompass a wide variety of violent acts. News Release, supra note 178,
at 2; Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 178. This is true since women are subject to
a variety of violent acts motivated by gender. However, the fact that the VAWA is complete (in that
it would cover a wide variety of discriminatory acts) does not make the Act any less valid or necessary.
Surely the legitimacy of a civil rights action should not depend on the amount of force employed, or
on the classification of the crime in any narrow sense. Rather, the motivation of the perpetrator of the
crime should be the focus of consideration. A misdemeanor assault is no less worthy of federal civil
rights protection than a rape if both are motivated by the same immutable characteristic of the victim,
namely her gender. The protection guaranteed to racial minoiities under section 1985(3) of the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871 is not limited to violent crimes that rise to the level of a felony; rather, that statute
broadly encompasses "any deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988). Similarly, Title III should not be limited to only "serious"
crimes of violence, but it should encompass any crime of violence motivated by the victim's gender.
236. Cf Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (discussing application of 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3), which is the codified, current version of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871); S. REP. No. 197,
supra note 11, at 49.
237. See generally Griffln, 403 U.S. 88.
238. Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 28 (1981). If the desire to limit
federal caseload were the sole factor in making decisions about the legitimacy of civil rights laws, most
current civil rights legislation would never have been enacted. The point of the VAWA is that since
women, like other minorities, are often the victims of group-motivated violence, they should receive
federal civil rights protection. "The simple desire to reduce the federal caseload provides no guidelines
to help us determine the most important uses of limited federal court resources." Id. at 29.
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Finally, the U.S. Judicial Conference opposes the VAWA because it
fears that the rights created under Title III would be "invoked as a
bargaining tool within the context of divorce negotiations."239
Unfortunately, this argument relies on some of the same stereotypes which
the VAWA seeks to abolish-that women are likely to file frivolous
lawsuits for ulterior motives.24 ° In fact, "there is no reason to assume
that women-any more than any other group-will file false and
vindictive civil rights claims for ulterior purposes.""" As with other
civil cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11242 can be used to combat
frivolous lawsuits under Title 111.243 Accordingly, the right of women to
be free from discriminatory violence should not be withheld because of
unwarranted assumptions about the likelihood of frivolous lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
Women have suffered a long and continuing history of discrimination
and inequality in the United States.24 4 Civil rights legislation to protect
women from workplace discrimination is a positive step forward.
However, gender-motivated violence and discrimination in other areas of
life continue to be serious problems. Title III of the VAWA, relying on
pre-existing civil rights statutes, attempts to address this problem by
defining gender-motivated violence as a bias crime, and by allowing the
victims of such violence to sue their attackers in federal court for
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and any other relief
the court deems appropriate.
No one presumes that passage of the VAWA would instantly eliminate
the national problem of gender-based violence.2 45 It would, however,
address "a serious flaw in our national psyche. 2 46 The effects of
passing a civil rights bill for victims of gender-based violence, while
difficult to determine beforehand, can be generally classified as both
symbolic and practical.

239. Judicial Conference of the United States, supra note 178; News Release, supra note 178, at 2.
240. See supra note 135 (discussing stereotypical belief that women file false rape suits to be
vindictive).
241. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 48.
242. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
243. See S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 48.
244. See generally part I.
245. See HearingsPart I, supra note 7, at 3 (statement of Sen. Biden) ("I am not suggesting the
solution I have put forward is the totality of the solution."); S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 35.
246. Hearings PartI, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Sen. Biden).
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Symbolically, the passage of civil rights legislation acknowledges the
existence of a very serious problem.247 It would raise public awareness
of the problem24 and convey the message "that violence motivated by

gender is not merely an individual crime or a personal injury, but is a
form of discrimination, an assault on a publicly-shared ideal of
'
equality."249
Advocates of the VAWA hope that the legislation, like
prior civil rights legislation, will "change the Nation's attitude"2 5
toward discriminatory violence against women. 25'

Practically, the VAWA would provide women a superior forum for the
adjudication of their rights: an alternative to inadequate and biased state
judicial systems, both civil and criminal. Women would "be able to get
into the best court system in the world, with the most educated judges in
the world and with a set of rules and regulations and a degree of
sensitivity that is uniform. "252
Unfortunately, civil remedies of any kind do have drawbacks. Though
the use of state civil suits as remedies for sexual assault has received
increased attention in recent years,253 the actual number of suits brought
has been very limited. 4 In cases of rape, there remains the problem of
catching the attacker, who, even if caught,255 may be judgment
proof.256 The same problem could exist in domestic violence cases.

247. Id.
248. Id. at3.
249. Id. at 69 (statement of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
250. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Biden).
251. Several studies show that attitudes about rape, for example, are in serious need of change. In
one study, over half of the male participants suggested they would consider committing a rape if they
could be sure they would not be caught. Torrey, supra note 8, at 1023-24. In another study of junior
high students, 25% of the boys and 20% of the girls stated that it was a man's right to force sex on a
woman if he "spent $10 on her.",HearingsPartIf, supra note 4, at 3. Research on high school males
and males in the general population reveals that 50% think it is acceptable for a.man to rape a woman
if she gets him sexually excited, or if she says "yes" to sex and then changes her mind. Torrey, supra
note 8, at 1024.
252. Hearings PartI, supra note 7, at 2.
253. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
254. Less than one percent of all rape victims have received damages by judgment in a civil jury
trial. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 44. Over the past 10 years, only 255 civil suits in sexual assault
cases have reached a jury; this figure excludes any suits that were dismissed, settled, or tried before a
judge. Id. Of course, there is no indication that this trend will continue if the VAWA is passed. The
VAWA would hopefully solve some of the very problems that have kept women from pursuing civil
remedies in larger numbers.
255. See, e.g., S. REp. No. 197, supra note 11, at 44 nA2 ("[A]n individual who commits rape has
only about 4 chances in 100 of being arrested, prosecuted, and found guilty of any offense.").
256. The U.S. Department of Justice gathers a variety of information on criminal offenders, including
age, race, sex, and relation to the victim. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

(1989). However, there is little data on the economic status of

offenders, apparently because many offenders are never caught.
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Thus, Title III would present the most practical benefits in cases where
the perpetrator of violence is not immune from civil suit because of
indigency. The extent of these drawbacks and the subsequent practical
efficacy of Title III would be hard to determine until the courts give
substance to the language of the Act. By using the analogy to racially
motivated crimes and by following the Act's legislative intent, courts
could interpret the Act broadly enough to encompass most, if not all,
rapes and many cases of domestic violence. Heavy emphasis should be
placed on factors such as a prior history of abusing or attacking women.
This would serve the purposes of the Act and would provide the victims
of discrimination the opportunity to vindicate their interests in federal
court. If a narrow, restrictive interpretation were developed by the courts,
legislative intent would be frustrated, and Title III would do little to solve
the problem it is meant to address.
When half of our population is being deprived of its most basic civil
rights and is being relegated to second-class citizenship because it is
female,"5 7 some action must be taken. The VAWA is a vital first step in
eliminating the problem. As one witness testified before the Senate
Judiciary Committee: "Until women as a class have the same protection
offered others who are the object of irrational, hate-motivated abuse and
assault, we as a society should feel humiliated and ashamed."25' 8

257. Hearings Part I, supra note 7, at 62 (statement of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
258. S. REP. No. 197, supra note 11, at 43 (testimony of Roland Burnis, Illinois Attorney General).
Our society has more reason to be ashamed than many others; "the United States has the highest rape
rate of any industrialized country...." Torrey, supra note 8, at 1018.

Editor's Note
The Editors and Associates of the Indiana Law Journal are delighted to
dedicate this issue of the Journalto commemorate the 150th anniversary of
the Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. This issue represents a
collaboration among the most integral parts of the Law School community-the faculty, students, and alumni.
About one year ago, the Journal's Board of Editors invited the faculty to
submit essays, articles, and commentaries on the future of the law. We put
few limitations on the the types of submissions faculty could make. The
approaches the faculty took are as diverse as the subjects they teach and write
about. While exploring the influences of the past on our present, some have
chosen to predict the impact of legislative and judicial trends. Others identify
and critically examine weaknesses in our legal institutions, and suggest
approaches to improve these institutions in the future. Still others have taken
this opportunity to think about old issues in new ways. The result is a
thoughtful and dynamic issue that reflects the creative scholarship of our
faculty.
Included in this issue is a slightly revised and annotated version of a lecture
delivered in December, 1992, by one of the Law School's distinguished
alumni, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson. Her lecture
commemorated the inaugural lecture of the Indiana University Law Department, which was presented in December, 1842, by Judge David McDonald,
the first professor of law at Indiana University. The addition of Justice
Abrahamson's piece to this issue is a small yet inspiring representation of the
vitality of the alumni of this great Law School.
I hope you enjoy this survey on the future of the law.

PatrickS. Cross
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